Defending Narrators at the Expense of Reason
On the criticism of hadith narrators
Defending Narrators at the Expense of Reason
Why a trustworthy but fallible narrator should not be protected by interpretations that reason and conscience reject.
In his discussion of an objectionable narration, Badr al-Dīn al-Houthi (d. 1431 AH) articulates a striking principle concerning the treatment of hadith narrators:
Badr al-Dīn al-Houthi
“I say: This interpretation is forced and defies reason. It is more reasonable to regard the narrator as lying than to resort to strained explanations that conscience (ḍamīr) rejects, even if the tongue gives voice to them. For the narrator is not immune from lying, nor has any proof been established that obliges us to treat him as though he were. Why, then, should we deny our own understanding, shackle our thinking, and silence ourselves rather than challenge the narrator’s credibility—with no compelling reason for such restraint—when he relates something that sound discernment and unfettered thought recognise as objectionable?”
— Al-Zuhri: Ahadithuhu wa-Siratuhu, p. 98
“A narrator should not be defended at the expense of reason.” — the principle in brief
Trustworthiness is not infallibility
The principle here is straightforward: a narrator should not be defended at the expense of reason.
A narrator may be considered trustworthy, but trustworthiness is not infallibility. If narrators are acknowledged to be capable of lying, then their reports cannot be approached with the assumption that they must be vindicated at all costs. To do so would effectively treat a fallible narrator as maʿṣūm—infallible—without any proof that he should be accorded such a status.
When interpretation becomes strained
This is especially important when attempts to defend a narration result in increasingly strained interpretations. Interpretation (taʾwīl) certainly has its place: apparent difficulties can sometimes be reconciled, context can resolve misunderstandings, and what initially appears objectionable may have a reasonable explanation. But interpretation ceases to be persuasive when it requires us to suppress reasonable objections simply because questioning the narrator has been ruled out beforehand.
Keeping fallibility a genuine possibility
The point is not that every difficult narration should be rejected, nor that narrators should casually be accused of lying. Rather, when preserving a narration requires an interpretation that is more unreasonable than accepting the possibility that the narrator has related something untrue, the narrator’s fallibility must remain a genuine possibility.
Otherwise, the critic ends up doing precisely what Badr al-Dīn al-Houthi objects to: shackling his own understanding and forcing the evidence to protect a narrator who was never infallible in the first place.
Reference — Houthi, Badr al-Din. “Al-Zuhri: Ahadithuhu wa-Siratuhu.” Majallat ‘Ulum al-Hadith. p. 98.