Can the jurisprudence of the Imāmī school be trusted in what they narrate from their Imams?
The question:
Can the jurisprudence of the Imāmī school be trusted in what they transmit from their Imams, and can it be presented as the jurisprudence of the leading figures of the descendants of al-Ḥusayn—peace be upon them?
The answer:
That is not possible except with great scholarly difficulty, for several reasons:
First reason:
Imāmī jurisprudence is often inconsistent and contradictory in its narrations from their Imams, to the extent that Shaykh al-Ṭūsī himself acknowledged that there is hardly any narration without another opposing it.
Second reason:
Part of Imāmī jurisprudence is transmitted by meaning rather than exact wording, with narrators altering it according to their own choices (i.e., distortion of wording). At the forefront of this is Shaykh al-Ṣadūq—despite the breadth of his narrations and his role as a conduit for many books and foundational texts.
Third reason:
Imāmī jurisprudence is based on a principle they hold, namely taqiyya (dissimulation), meaning that their Imams deliberately differed in their narrations to protect their followers. As a result, numerous mutually contradictory reports are attributed to them, transmitted by the major early authorities of the Imāmī school.
Fourth reason:
Imāmī jurisprudence was incorporated into foundational texts to which material not originally part of them was added, due to the prevalence of fabrication during the times of the Imams al-Bāqir, al-Ṣādiq, al-Kāẓim, and others—peace be upon them.
Fifth reason:
A portion—indeed, the greater part—of Imāmī jurisprudence is based on the doctrinal choices of Shaykh al-Mufīd, whose underlying principles are unknown: whether he derived them from texts, analogy, or independent reasoning in his book al-Muqniʿa. Then Shaykh al-Ṭūsī built upon these choices by reconciling and pitting the narrations of their Imams against one another to conform to al-Mufīd’s selections in Tahdhīb al-Aḥkām. Thus, in a large part, the jurisprudence reflects al-Mufīd’s choices.
Sixth reason:
One of the foundational principles of the Imāmī school in weighing evidence and prioritizing the jurisprudence attributed to their Imams is adopting whatever differs from the majority (the Sunnis), considering that to be the correct guidance. This is an unscientific and non-objective principle, as it builds a jurisprudence of anomaly precisely because it is anomalous. This rule remains firmly established to this day. Thus, if two sound narrations are reported from Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq—peace be upon him—the one that differs is adopted.
Seventh reason:
As for the attempt by some to argue that a book authored by al-Ḥaddāʾ—a researcher in Islamic studies—comparing Imāmī jurisprudence with Sunni jurisprudence demonstrates a large degree of conformity, we respond that the author of that book was not successful. This is because he selected only one strand of the narrations attributed to the leading figures of the descendants of al-Ḥusayn—peace be upon them—in Imāmī sources, and then sought Sunni narrations that agree with it—many of which are considered weak by Sunni standards—while neglecting other narrations that are sound according to the Imāmīs themselves, which also have corroborating reports from the descendants of al-Ḥusayn—peace be upon them—but contradict Imāmī jurisprudence, such as narrations regarding washing the feet (in wuḍūʾ), the prohibition of temporary marriage (mutʿa), and others.
Eighth reason:
A number of Imāmī jurists themselves did not attain juristic confidence that their legal narrations truly originated from their Imams. For this reason, Ibn Ṭāwūs withdrew from issuing legal opinions and confined himself to his home, due to the obscurity of the narrations among them and their mutual contradictions attributed to the Household (al-ʿitra). Likewise, the implication of al-Baḥrānī’s words in al-Riyāḍ al-Nāḍira is that knowing legal rulings became extremely difficult because of taqiyya. This is further clarified by the leading uṣūlī scholar al-Waḥīd al-Bihbahānī, who stated that only a tenth of a tenth of their jurisprudence from the Household came through a sound chain. He says:
“There is no doubt about the corruption of this line of argument, for it entails closing the door entirely to establishing jurisprudence. There is no doubt that nine-tenths of a tenth of jurisprudence has not been transmitted through a sound ḥadīth, and even that portion transmitted through what is deemed sound is not free from numerous defects—whether in the chain, the text, the indication, or due to contradiction with another sound report, or with the Qurʾān, or with consensus, or otherwise—as we have indicated in al-Fawāʾid.”
(al-Fawāʾid al-Ḥāʾiriyya, p. 488)
Thus, a researcher should reflect for himself and not be deceived by Ibn Taymiyya’s praise, in one place, of Imāmī jurisprudence. For that praise was followed by his rejection of Imāmī transmissions; rather, his praise was merely to discharge responsibility for a position in which he himself had dissented, a position the Imāmīs happened to hold. Similarly, we find some Sufis today who claim inheritance (spiritual succession) from the Twelve Imams while adopting Sunni thought; yet they have no evidence for this Twelver inheritance except Imāmī books. As a result, they zealously promote Imāmī reports in order to justify their own divergence from the wider community in that claim of inheritance. It is nothing but necessity that drives them. Indeed, upon close examination, Imāmī narrations would completely undermine their Sufi doctrine—hence the contradiction alongside the need.
Likewise, the Sufi falls into the predicament of opposing the early Imams of the Household, such as Zayd, al-Nafs al-Zakiyya, and al-Nafs al-Raḍiyya—peace be upon them—and thus he fervently employs Rafidite narrations of differentiation in support of Sufi doctrine. This too is driven by necessity, and represents an alliance of hostility and rejection—excluding, of course, the moderate Sufis. I am not saying that the entire Imāmī narrative heritage is absolutely devoid of authenticity; rather, I say that attaining juristic confidence through it would be difficult. And praise be to God.
May God grant you success.
O God, send prayers and peace upon Muḥammad and upon the family of Muḥammad.
Translation of Ustadh Kadhim Al Zaydi (May Allah reward him)