The Ruling on the Imamate from a Rational Perspective
For students of knowledge, when discussing matters related to the ruling on the Imamate from a purely rational perspective, it is essential to distinguish properly between a purely rational judgment and a revealed, scriptural (auditory) legal judgment. Whoever fails to make this distinction and instead conflates the two will neither discuss the issue correctly nor understand it properly. Connected to this is the question of divine grace (luṭf).
I have come across Imāmī (Twelver Shīʿī) treatises that discuss Zaydī views regarding the rational ruling of the Imamate, and I found that their later scholars do not reach even a tenth of what their early predecessors—al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and Shaykh al-Ṭūsī—had attained. Rather, I found among later Imāmīs those who undermine the arguments of al-Murtaḍā and al-Ṭūsī—and others like them among the early scholars—not due to any reason that necessitates refutation, but because of the absence of a sound theological (kalām) methodology among later Imāmīs. They failed to discuss the issue in a purely rational manner as their predecessors did. Unfortunately, the discussions of some later Imāmīs have been dominated by an Akhbārī methodology, or one influenced by their own sectarian assumptions, which they treat as axioms. Through this, they seek directly to pre-empt and override purely rational judgments. This is not merely inversion, but outright subversion.
What prompted me to write this is that I read an attempt by one of the Imāmīs to debate one of the scholars of the Prophet’s Household (peace be upon them). I was so astonished that I laughed—and “one of the worst calamities is that which makes one laugh.” I do not know where this dark Imāmī heritage will lead the minds of its adherents.
Foundations and Elaboration
The purely rational ruling in our discussion refers to reasoning about the necessity or non-necessity of the Imamate using reason alone, without recourse to any religious texts (the Qur’an or the Sunnah).
The effective cause (ʿillah) in our discussion is the essential and necessary reason that makes the ruling of obligation for the Imamate binding. By this we mean the cause upon which the ruling depends in both its existence and its absence.
So what is the rational cause for the obligation of the Imamate? It is people’s pressing need for stability and the preservation of order. This need is what leads reason to judge that the existence of a leader (an Imam) is obligatory. As long as this need exists, the obligation exists; otherwise, it is rationally permissible or merely allowed. Reason allows for the existence of small or large societies whose way of life is stable without the need for a leader. Accordingly, rational obligation is not a fixed and absolute ruling in all circumstances; rather, it is a ruling that changes with changing conditions that give rise to the need.
Based on this principle, it is not correct to say from the outset that the Imamate is rationally obligatory in an absolute sense, because this obligation is conditional upon the occurrence of its cause.
Upon whom does the rational obligation of appointing an Imam fall?
The obligation falls upon rational agents themselves. For reason obligates rational people that, once the cause and need arise—such as disorder in their affairs, aggression of some against others, whether internally or externally, and the like—they appoint someone in whom the qualities of leadership are found, by whom their affairs are properly ordered. This is what rational people do in every age whenever this cause arises among them. It is not correct for the obligation to fall upon God, exalted is He, to appoint an Imam who preserves their order; because divine appointment and obligation upon God with respect to people presuppose the existence of a revealed law (sharīʿa). The sharīʿa is what discloses God’s designation of a specific Imam. For claiming that it is obligatory upon God to appoint an Imam necessarily entails explicit textual designation and naming of a specific individual, and this is itself contingent upon the sharīʿa. There is no meaning to obligating God to appoint an Imam to remove the cause (disorder among people) in the absence of a sharīʿa among them. In such a situation, people would be unable to know their Imam, since there would be no prophetic revelation between them and God—and the discussion here remains strictly within the bounds of pure rational judgment. Thus, for those who claim that the rational obligation of the Imamate rests upon God, the ruling of the Imamate ceases to be a purely rational ruling and instead reverts to being a revealed, legal one. It is false for anyone to claim that no community has ever existed without a sharīʿa that indicates to them a specifically named Imam.
Moreover, if one were to claim rational obligation upon God regarding the Imamate on the basis that the cause (disorder among people) necessarily persists at all times in small and large societies across the entire world—and therefore that the Imamate is rationally obligatory due to the permanence of its cause and the impossibility of its cessation—then it would rationally follow that God must place an Imam in every location and every society due to the cause of need. No rational person holds such a view. Rather, the Imāmīs adopted the view that the Imam is one individual only from within the framework of the sharīʿa; at that point, their claim regarding a single Imam departs from being a purely rational judgment.
How is the rational cause of obligation (preserving social order) invalidated against the Imāmīs during the era of occultation?
They claim that the obligation rests upon God, and that obligation with respect to Him—glorified is He—means that it is necessitated by His wisdom that an Imam must exist among the people due to the persistence of the cause of need (disorder among people). Yet for twelve centuries they have believed in the occultation of one whose existence in the community is supposedly indispensable for realizing the requirement of God’s wisdom (i.e., obligation upon God). At the same time, they claim that divine wisdom itself is what caused the occultation of that Imam whose existence that very wisdom required among people to remove the cause. This is sheer absurdity—far exalted is God above any absurdity.
Perhaps I may cite an awakening statement for the Imāmīs from within their own heritage, clarifying that it is not valid to ascribe wisdom in every respect to the Wise One—glorified is He—when concealing one whom people cannot do without. Imam al-Riḍā (peace be upon him) said:
“It is not permissible, according to the wisdom of the Wise, to leave creation without that which He knows they cannot do without and by which they subsist: by it they fight their enemy, distribute their spoils, establish their unity and community, and prevent the oppressor from wronging the oppressed. Among these matters is that if He did not appoint for them an upright, trustworthy, preserving guardian, the religion would perish, the world would be lost, the norms and rulings would be altered, innovators would add to it, atheists would subtract from it, and they would confuse it for the Muslims. For we have found creation deficient, needy, and incomplete, with differences among them, divergence in their desires, and dispersion in their paths. Had He not appointed for them a guardian to preserve what the Messenger—peace and blessings be upon him and his family—brought, they would have become corrupt as we have explained, the laws, norms, rulings, and faith would have been altered, and that would be the corruption of all creation altogether.”
(ʿUyūn Akhbār al-Riḍā).
I have cited this passage only as a reminder concerning the matter of wisdom, and to show that the obligation of the Imamate was established through revelation and law, not pure reason—due to issues related to the necessity of implementing God’s rulings as the operative cause.
Will the Imāmī understand, or should we instead address this to al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and Shaykh al-Ṭūsī?
If you wish to ascertain whether an Imāmī truly understands the totality of the issue here, observe the following: if you find him attributing a twelve-century occultation to one without whom it is not proper to obligate the servants—whose obligation and existence are supposedly required by divine wisdom—and if you find him attributing that occultation to divine wisdom itself, then his opponent is rational people in general. Such a person neither understands nor possesses knowledge; he must learn the discipline of theological methodology before writing or speaking. Another sign is that you will find him engaging more in transmitted reports and sectarian assumptions than in purely rational judgments, whose foundational principles are independent of legal and transmitted matters.
May God grant you success.
O God, send prayers and peace upon Muḥammad and upon the family of Muḥammad.
Translation of Ustadh Kadhim Al Zaydi (May Allah reward him)